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Mistake, Failure of Consideration and the Planning Theory of Intention 
Duncan Sheehan 
 
This paper seeks to begin an important project of examining in philosophical terms the unjust 
factors present in µfailure of consideration¶ DQGµmistake¶ claims. There has been considerable 
work done to rationalise the doctrinal foundations of unjust enrichment, but there has been 
much less examination of the philosophical basis or structure of the different unjust factors. 
Such an examination is long overdue. There are clear structural and analytical differences 
among these factors.1 
 
There are many different theories of intention currently discussed in philosophical 
circles, which may be relevant to unjust enrichment law. This paper is based Michael 
Bratman¶VVubstantial work describing the analytical characteristics of both individual and 
collective intention, and uses it to elucidate the structure of these two claims. There are a 
number of reasons to rest the paper on Bratman. First, Bratman has attempted to model 
intention as a distinctive mental state, as opposed to a type of belief, which plays a unique 
role in our thinking and is subject to unique normative requirements; this seems to reflect the 
implicit assumption of English law, which talks of intention and belief separately%UDWPDQ¶V
work has been highly influential and much contemporary action theory has flown from 
%UDWPDQ¶VLQVLJKWV ± to which we turn in detail in the substantive part of this essay - about the 
distinctive nature of intention. The very prominence and influence of his theory provide one 
reason for examining it. Secondly, many of the legal problems we attempt to solve through 
the law of restitution involve failed plans; in a failure of consideration case one party agrees 
to help another paint a house, but leaves before it is finished. The plan to paint the house 
together fails. In a mistake claim the plan may be to discharge a debt, but because there is no 
debt, the plan fails. %UDWPDQFDOOVKLVWKHRU\WKH³SODQQLQJWKHRU\´. His theory therefore fits 
with the aim of the law of restitution in dealing with plans. There is more to it than that, 
however. $SHUVRQ¶Vintentions not only cause her to act but help to shape her practical 
reasoning over time. ,QRWKHUZRUGV%UDWPDQ¶VWKHRU\SURYLGes, as we see later in this paper, 
a holistic picture about how we form intentions and plans and how different reasons and 
norms interact in that process. As Klass explains, by doing so Bratman allows for a clearer 
and more complete description of the diffHUHQWW\SHVRIFRQGLWLRQVRQDQDJHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQ and 
                                                 

 Professor of Law, University of East Anglia. This paper was presented at the Restitution 
section of the SLS Conference at Edinburgh University in September 2013. Many thanks to 
those who contributed to the discussion and to Charles Mitchell, Fred Wilmot-Smith and Steve 
Smith for their kind comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to the referee for their own 
observations and suggestions. All remaining errors are my own.  
1
 Duress and undue influence for example are probably not based on the effect of conditional 
intentioQEXWRQLPSURSHULQIOXHQFHRQWKHFODLPDQW¶VSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJ 
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their effect on her planning processes than many other attempts.2 This is important because 
the argument of this paper is that both the unjust factors it deals with rest on conditional 
intention. Thirdly, the common law is often said, by for example Mitchell McInnes, to have a 
very individualistic bent to it.3 %UDWPDQ¶Vown highly individual-oriented view is most clearly 
seen, as discussed below, in his discussion of collective intention where he rejects the plural 
or group subject used by other theorists. $VVXFKWKHUHDUHSDUDOOHOVEHWZHHQ%UDWPDQ¶V
thinking and how we often think of the common law that invite an investigation into what his 
ideas can bring to the consideration of the law of restitution. %UDWPDQ¶VLVQRWWKHRQO\WKHRU\
of intention that might be described as concentrating on the operation of psychological states 
ZLWKLQLQGLYLGXDOV¶PLQGVDVRSSRVHGWRDPHWDSK\VLFDOFROOHFWLYH to explain joint intention; 
however, because of the prominence his view has we can take it as representative.  
 
 The paper is divided into two main sections, the first on mistake and the second on 
failure of consideration. ,WKDVRIWHQEHHQVDLGWKDWPLVWDNHYLWLDWHVWKHFODLPDQW¶VLQWHQWLRQ
but that failure of consideration is based on an unfulfilled condition. This is a false 
dichotomy. Both claims on the basis of a mistaken payment and on the basis of failure of 
consideration are based on conditional intention. While mistake claims are based on 
conditional individual intention, failure of consideration claims are based on conditions 
affecting collective intention. The first section explores individual intention; it explains what 
a conditional intention is and I argue that in a mistaken payment case the claimDQW¶V action 
and intention do not coincide LQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKHFODLPDQW¶Vintention has in essence ³UXQ
RXW´; it does not cover the action as it in fact turns out. The second section is sub-divided into 
different parts. First, we explore intentions as to the future. This is needed because the 
condition in failure of consideration cases is often future counter-performance by the other 
party or some other future event. Normally predictions of the future are of no effect; the 
claimant cannot recover money paid as a result of a misprediction. Nonetheless, for intentions 
to function as planning tools, they must be future-oriented and thus we must look to see what 
impact this estimation of the future has on justifying the non-relief in misprediction cases we 
normally find. 
  
The second subsection of (2) below examines collective intention. Collective intention is 
dependent on the interaction of DWOHDVWWZRSDUWLHV¶LQGLYLGXDOLQWHQWLRQV4 The way in which 
conditions affect collective intentionality is complex, and the paper aims to explain how 
IDLOXUHRIFRQVLGHUDWLRQPLJKWZRUNEDVHGRQWKHLQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHV¶LQGLYLGXDO
                                                 
2
 *UHJRU\.ODVVµ$&RQGLWLRQDO ,QWHQW WR3HUIRUP¶/HJDO7KHRU\ 107 at 109-10; 
Klass discusses other theories and their shortcomings at 112-16.  
3
 0LWFKHOO0F,QQHVµ7KH5HDVRQWR5HYHUVH8QMXVW)DFWRUVDQG-XULVWLF5HDVRQV¶
Boston UL Rev 1049 
4
 It is possible for a collective intention to involve three or even more people. A soccer team or 
section of the team (strikers and midfielders perhaps) might form a collective intention to 
mount an attack and try to score a goal, but this will probably involve more than two players. 
For our purposes we will stick to two person collective intentions 
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intentions and conditions affecting those intentions. We see this has important benefits for 
our understanding of the common law, and better defining the proper limits of failure of 
consideration.  
 
(1) Mistake  
 
The first part of this section examines what it means to intend something. This is essential if 
mistake is to be understood in terms of a failure of intent. There is clearly something awry 
with the intention and its relation to the facts as they stand when I am mistaken.  The second 
part of this section aims therefore to see how we should understand philosophical accounts of 
conditional intention, and the third part applies that to how we understand mistake.  
 
(A) The Nature and Characteristics of Individual Intention 
 
The justification for a mistaken payment claimRUµPLVWDNHFODLP¶ is sometimes put in terms 
of our being self-legislating autonomous agents,5 DQGWKDWWKHPLVWDNH³YLWLDWHV´RUFUHDWHVD
flaw in our intention. To be mistaken is to have a belief in something which can at that point 
be in principle proven to be incorrect.6  What then is an intention that such a proven mistake 
PLJKW³YLWLDWH´"A preliminary point is required. It has been said that intending to A is a 
cause of my A-ing,7 because my intention settles or decides the question of whether I am 
going to A. This is controversial from a philosophical perspective, but given the legal 
necessity for some proof of causation - mistakes must be shown to have caused the mistaken 
payment ± we can leave those complexities behind, and concentrate initially on the question 
of what does it mean to say I intend to A.  
 
(i) Analysing intention  
 
PhilosophiFDOSHUSOH[LW\DERXWLQWHQWLRQUHYROYHVDURXQGWKUHHWKLQJVIXWXUHLQWHQWLRQ³,
intend to type up a section of my paper WRPRUURZ´LQWHQWLRQZLWKZKLFKI act ³,W\SHZLWK
WKHLQWHQWLRQRIZULWLQJDVHFWLRQRIP\SDSHUDQGLQWHQWLRQDODFWLRQ³,W\SHintentionally.) 
                                                 
5
 $UXQD1DLUµ³0LVWDNHVRI/DZ´DQG/HJDO5HDVRQLng: Interpreting Kleinwort Benson v 
Lincoln City Council¶LQ5REHUW&KDPEHUV&KDUOHV0LWFKHOODQG-DPHV3HQQHUHGV
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 373 at 389 
6
 'XQFDQ6KHHKDQµ:KDWLVD0LVWDNH"¶/6 
7
 'RQDOG'DYLGVRQµ$FWLRQV5HDVRQVDQG&DXVHV¶LQ'RQDOG'DYLGVRQHGEssays on 
Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) 3; this could be described as the 
VWDQGDUGVWRU\/XFD)HUUHURµ$FWLRQ¶LQ-RKQ6KDQGed, Central Issues in Philosophy 
(Oxford: Blackwell, VHHDOVR*HRUJH:LOVRQDQG6DPXHO6KSDOOµ$FWLRQ¶
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy  (2012) at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action p 2  
4 
 
The principal task of the philosophy of intention, as I understand it, is to uncover the unity 
between these three things.8 This part of Section (1) has two subparts. The first examines 
what an intention actually is. The second explores the relationship between intention and 
autonomy, and questions of agential authority.   
 
This part of the essay is avowedly introductory; it aims to lay the groundwork for later 
sections. In particular it describes for example how intention functions as a planning tool and 
how it is future-oriented. That future orientation is something we return to when we examine 
mispredictions in section 2(A) ± predictions (say) that A will happen next week only to find 
B happens. Intention is for Bratman integral in practical reasoning.9 He suggests that explains 
a methodological priority for future-directed intention. While I am eating breakfast therefore 
it is fair to say that I intend to start my car later to go to work. Once I am in the car, I am 
starting it; it now seems odd (at least colloquially) to talk of intending to start it.10 This feeds 
LQWR%UDWPDQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQRISODQVHe argues that we are all planning creatures. This is 
important for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that planning structures help to 
VXSSRUWIRUPVRIXQLW\WKDWDUHFHQWUDOWRZKDW%UDWPDQFDOOV³FURVV-temporal self-
JRYHUQDQFH´(VVHQWLDOO\SODQQLQJDOORZVXVWRFR-ordinate with our future selves.11 My plan 
to write this paper is constant over time. It allows me to organise myself over time so that I 
ILUVWUHDG%UDWPDQ¶VDUWLFOHVwith a view to understanding his theory and with a view to at the 
very end of the process tidying up the footnotes for this journal. Another important point is 
that we never plan everything out completely. Rather we decide to go to Bruges for the 
weekend say - and then decide how to achieve that at a later date ± get the Eurostar perhaps. 
Our plans are partial and so must be fleshed out in the future.12  
 
One question that arises is how that ties into the relationship with doing something 
intentionally. Bratman takes the view that when I intentionally A I must intend to do 
something, but I need not necessarily intend to A;13 he asks us to suppose then that there are 
cases where I A intentionally, but where I intend to B. In order to explain this he says there 
must be an account of the types of actions that may be performed intentionally in the course 
of executing a given intention. In doing so, he examines what he calls the simple view of 
                                                 
8
 See also .LHUDQ6HWL\Dµ,QWHQWLRQ¶Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014) at  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention  p 1 
9
 But see Robert Audi, Practical Reasoning (London: Routledge, 1989) at 123-25 
10
 Michael Bratman, Intention Plans and Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987) at 4 
11
 0LFKDHO%UDWPDQµ,QWHQWLRQ5DWLRQDOLW\¶Philosophical Explorations 227 at 228 
12
 -3:&DUWZULJKWµ&RQGLWLRQDO,QWHQWLRQV¶3KLORVRSKLFDO6WXGLHV0LFKDHO
%UDWPDQµ'DYLGVRQ¶V7KHRU\RI,QWHQWLRQ¶LQ0LFKDHO%UDWPDQHd, Faces of Intention 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 209 
13
 0LFKDHO%UDWPDQµ7KH7ZR)DFHVRI,QWHQWLRQ¶4) 93 Philosophical Review 375 at 
378 
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intention, which is the view that where I intentionally A, I must A with the intention of A-ing. 
Bratman suggests that it is in fact relatively easy to show that the simple view is incorrect.14 
He takes an example of throwing missiles at targets. There are two targets and it is impossible 
to hit both. If I hit one the other shuts off too, and if the machine detects I am on target to hit 
both simultaneously, one shuts off.15 If I know this, I cannot intend to hit both without being 
irrational ± my intentions and beliefs are not consistent. Clearly, giving both a go is perfectly 
sensible, yet the simple view tells us that if I succeed in hitting target 1, I do so intentionally. 
If I did so intentionally I must have intended to hit it, and symmetry demands the same 
intention apply as regards target 2. However, this seems to place me in a form of irrationality; 
I must intend to hit whichever one I hit, and therefore at the time I try to hit them I must 
intend to hit both. Yet I know that is impossible.16 The simple view is wrong.  
 
This, however, allows us to define the motivational potential of an intention; if I step 
onto a train in Norwich intending to go to London Liverpool Street, but get muddled and 
mistakenly step onto the Liverpool Lime Street train, I intentionally step onto the train and 
given my belief that it will go to London, part of my motivational potential for getting on the 
train is my intention to go to London. ,VWHSRQWKHWUDLQLQWHQWLRQDOO\EXWWKHLQWHQWLRQ³ZLWK
ZKLFK´,GRVRLVLPSDLUHG,WLVWKLVLQWHQWLRQ³ZLWKZKLFK´ZHDUHFRQFHUQHGDERXWLQRXU
discussion of mistakes. This is also consistent with the difference between objective and 
subjective impairment of our intention. If my intention is subjectively impaired, say by 
duress, the law provides that the impaired transfer is valid, but can be rescinded.17 If it is 
objectively impaired, so I did not know there was a transfer, I retain legal title to the asset.18 
We can say that I did not transfer the asset intentionally. Mistake is controversial, although in 
Pitt v Holt19, Lord Walker said that for the equitable jurisdiction to set aside voluntary 
disposition to be used the donor must PDNHD³FDXVDWLYHPLVWDNHRIVXIILFLHQWJUDYLW\´ZKLFK
will normally, in what he VDLGZDV³DGGLWLRQDO JXLGDQFH´ be satisfied only if the matter is 
basic to the transaction, or as to its legal character or nature.20 
 
There are three norms that for Bratman are characteristic of intending, which, as we see 
later in section C (i), would be affected by a mistake. Our intentions must be means-end 
coherent; they must be consistent with my beliefs and my intentions must meet the 
requirements of agglomerativity. I take means-end coherence first. Means-end coherence 
involves the idea that the means by which I intend to do A must be a method I believe will 
                                                 
14
 Ibid at 377-78; see also Setiya, supra note 8 at 6 
15
 Bratman, supra note 13 at 381-83 
16
 Ibid at 383; Bratman supra note 10 at ch 8 
17
 6HHLQJHQHUDO%LUNH+lFNHUµ3URSULHWDU\5HVWLWXWLRQLQ,PSDLUHG&RQVHQW7UDQVIHUV$
*HQHUDOLVHG3RZHU0RGHO¶>@&/- 
18
 R v Ashwell (1885) 16 QBD 190; Moffatt v Kazana [1969] 2 QB 159 
19
 [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 156 
20
 Ibid [122]  
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enable me to do A.21 I am typing with the intention of writing a subsection on intention, but if 
I were to paint a landscape with that intention, my intentions would not be means-end 
coherent, because painting a landscape does not help, nor do I seriously believe it will.22 To 
be means-end coherent at any given time means that my intentions must include sub-plans to 
accomplish them. The second characteristic is intention-belief consistency. A good co-
ordinating plan must also be such that it is a plan for the world in that I should be able to 
realise while all my beliefs are true. The irrationality of intending something one knows to be 
impossible, to which we have already alluded, flows from this.23 I might without being 
LUUDWLRQDOZDQWWRSOD\IRRWEDOODQGILQLVKWKLVSDSHUEXWNQRZ,ZRQ¶WKDYHWLPHWRGRERWK,
cannot, however, rationally, knowing that, intend both.24 The third criterion is 
agglomerativity.25 This requires that if the agent intends A and also intends B then she 
intends A and B. It must therefore be possible (as she believes) to both A and B. If that is not 
possible, the agent will have to decide whether to A or B. It should be possible to 
DJJORPHUDWHRQH¶VYDULRXVLQWHQWLRQVLQDZD\WKDWFUHDWHVDODUJHULQWHQWLRQIn other words 
just as incomplete plans require sub-plans to carry them through, so sub-plans must be 
capable of forming a larger plan. 
 
(ii) Intention and agential authority  
 
We are used in the philosophy of action to drawing a distinction between two different kinds 
of action; actions that are governed or directed by the agent ± things she does - and are 
therefore truly attributable to her and those that merely happen to her.26 It is sometimes said 
that a policy that has agential authority speaks for the agent. This is jargon, but refers to the 
fact that the agent directs or governs the action and so the policy must be what Bratman refers 
to as a self-governing policy. The critical thing is that we have desires about our actions, but 
also the capacity to step back and reflect on whether to act on them. It is those higher order 
self-governing policies which say which desires we treat in our deliberation as justifying 
reasons for action,27 and which play a role in our practical reasoning as to what to do next and 
why. For example I might desire a cigarette, but critically reflect that I ought for health 
reasons to give up. That policy to improve my health has agential authority because it directs 
and governs my decision to give up smoking.  
                                                 
21
 0LFKDHO%UDWQDQµ,QWHQWLRQDQG0HDQV-(QG&RKHUHQFH¶3KLORVRSKLFDO5HYLHZ
252 
22
 Bratman supra note 10 at 31 
23
 /XFD)HUUUHURµ&RQGLWLRQDO,QWHQWLRQV¶ :4 Nous 700 at 711-12 
24
 Bratman, supra note 13 at 380-81; Bratman, supra note 9 at 38 
25
 Bratman, supra note 10 at 134-0LFKDHO%UDWPDQµ0RGHVW6RFLDOLW\DQGWKH
'LVWLQFWLYHQHVVRI,QWHQWLRQ¶) 144 Philosophical Studies 149 at 153 
26
 0LFKDHO%UDWPDQµ7ZR3UREOHPVLQ+XPDQ$JHQF\3URFHHGLQJVRIthe 
Aristotelian Society 309 at 311 
27
 0LFKDHO%UDWPDQµ9DOXLQJDQGWKH:LOO¶ Philosophical Perspectives 249 at 258 
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This idea has importance because our intentions, as a result of their critical role in our 
lives as planning agents, look not just to the present but to the future as well. We formulate 
intentions on the basis of assumptions and conditions some of which relate to the future and 
some to the immediate present. At each point we are concerned with the activity as a whole, 
including its future and its past components and in a future section we examine the way in 
which this is constituted philosophically in much more detail$SODQQLQJDJHQW¶VSXUSRVLYH
activity is therefore an interwoven structure ± hence the need for means-end consistency and 
agglomerativity - of partial, interlocking and more or less stable plans.28 When I start reading 
articles by Bratman I am not just reading articles, I am preparing for the research process and 
thinking ahead to which journal to publish in, but I have not necessarily decided which 
journal. The plan is partial, but it is stable ± after all you are now reading the essay. It seems 
that temporal extendedness is a deep feature of our agency, and the question arises whether 
there are higher order policies that support such agency.29  
 
The answer seems to be yes. For Bratman our higher order policies are critical in 
helping us structure our intentions over time and he argues this is an important part of an 
account of agential authority.30 Such self-governing policies with agential authority are 
policies that are general in their content and help to structure our intentions over time by 
keeping our current intentions consistent with those in the recent or not-so-recent past, and 
those regarding the future.31 Bratman takes a broadly Lockean view of personal identity, one 
which is accepted by this paper, and which identifies a person as a thinking being who can 
know itself as the same thinking being across time.32 We are not time-slice agents; we do, as 
indicated earlier, plan partly on the basis of the future, and this provides an important reason 
for adopting the Lockean view that Bratman does. Our general higher-order policies as to 
which desires and motivations we treat as important help to constitute that identity over time. 
My desire to do research is consistent over time, helps constitute my identity as an academic, 
and, as an appropriate reason for action, provides a justification for the work going into this 
paper. When I engage in practical reasoning, deciding what to do today for example, my 
stable higher order belief in the value of research helps to make sure that today I intend to 
UHGUDIWWKHSDSHUMXVWDV\HVWHUGD\,LQWHQGHGWRUHDG%UDWPDQ¶VQHZERRNDQGIXUWKHUWKDW,
re-draft on the basis of the ideas in the book, having yesterday read the book with a view to 
understanding if there were new ideas to incorporate.   
 
                                                 
28
 0LFKDHO%UDWPDQµ5HIOHFWLRQ3ODQQLQJDQG7HPSRUDOO\([WHQGHG$JHQF\¶
Philosophical Review 35 
29
 Bratman, supra note 27 at 258-59 
30
 Bratman, supra note 26 at 319-20 
31
 0LFKDHO%UDWPDQµ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQ0LFKDHO%UDWPDQHGStructures of Agency (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 at 6  
32
 John Locke, An Essay on Human Understanding (1690) book II, ch xxvii at para 9  
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It seems likely that the agent must be aware of these higher order attitudes and further 
be satisfied with them so he is not seeking to change them continually.33 Those attitudes will 
not be able to form a stable platform for the development of intentions if they change all the 
time. That is not to deny that our desires and preferences do in fact change over time, 
however. They need not therefore be immutable. There is a defeasible presumption against 
reconsideration of the attitudes, but that presumption against reconsideration still means that I 
am able to construct stable plans that add to my satisfaction with my life across time; I value 
not just that this paper get finished, but more precisely that I finish it.34 Lack of such stability 
may lead to conflict with prior plans, and unless the conflict is resolved to what Bratman 
UHIHUVWRDV³cross-temporal incoherence´, so that I intend mutually inconsistent things.35  
 
In summary we can model agentially directed practical reasoning as practical 
reasoning and planning guided by authoritative and stable self-governing policies. There is 
therefore a hierarchy of norms of differing levels of generality which help govern what I do, 
as opposed to what just happens. By contrast Bratman suggests that there can be cases where 
RQH¶VWKLQNLQJLVLQWKHJULSRIDQRUP.36 Here practical reasoning is somewhat attenuated, so 
I might decide to do whatever the person in charge says. Soldiers in battle often act in the 
grip of a norm and not really for themselves. Often this type of thinking is simply ignored by 
the law, but there may be cases where it indicates duress or undue influence where the law 
does take cognizance.37  
 
(B) Conditional Intentions 
 
(i) Internal and external conditions 
 
CRQGLWLRQVPD\EHLQWHUQDORUH[WHUQDOWRDSDUW\¶VLQWHQWLRQ38 A condition is internal when it 
is part of the content of the intention, and external when it is a condition of the formation of 
the intention. ([WHUQDOFRQGLWLRQVWKHUHIRUHWDNHWKHIRUP³,I;=ZLOOLQWHQGWR<´DQGZH
can put them to one side. As Cartwright rightly argues, a claim that intentions are conditional 
is generally seen as a claim of internal conditionality.39 In some cases there are explicit 
FRQGLWLRQVLQWKHDFWRU¶VPLQG,PLJKWWKLQN³,ILWLVVXQQ\WRPRUURZ,ZLOOJRWRWKHEHDFK´ 
                                                 
33
 Bratman, supra note 27 at 256 
34
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35
 Ibid at 255 
36
 0LFKDHO%UDWPDQµ$QFKRUVIRU'HOLEHUDWLRQ¶LQ&KULVWRSK/XPHUDQG6DQGUR1DQQLQLHGV
Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 187 
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of a norm, that being obedience to the mother superior.  
38
 Cartwright, supra note 12 at 235 
39
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(1979) 36 Philosophical Studies 245 
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However, just because I have not formulated explicit conditions does not mean I have an 
iQWHQWLRQWRDFW³FRPHZKDWPD\´40 In practice this type of completely unconditional 
intention is vanishingly unlikely and in theoretical terms problematic, as Ferrero explains.41 
As circumstances changed and we formed new intentions it would be impossible to keep 
them in synch so that our plans were rationally capable of being carried out; our intentions 
would not be agglomerative. Ferrero uses the example of Don Giovanni and suggests that he 
is set on pure unconditional pursuits; however, if he is set on several of those how does he 
handle conflicts? Because of their unconditional structure there is no plan for conflicting 
intentions.42 What if I unconditionally intend to play football and unconditionally intend to 
ILQLVKWKLVSDSHUEXWWKHUH¶VRQO\WLPHIRURQH"Pure unconditional intentions need to be 
atomistically separated so that each project is isolated. We are not that kind of agent.  
 
There will therefore be explicit and implicit conditions on our intentions all the time. 
It is impossible to outline a complete list of contingencies to cover any eventuality and this 
makes for a difficult question as to how to describe my conditional intention. I might say my 
intention is subject to the condition. ³LIQRWKLQJSUHYHQWVPH´or DFRQGLWLRQ³LI,FDQ.´These 
are not true conditions though.43 My capacity or ability to do something is not a reason to do 
it; it is merely a necessary condition. Even the falsity of the condition does not prevent my 
having the intention; I might intend to A but find myself unable to in fact A. We might also 
say I intend to A ³LIQRWKLQJKDSSHQVWKDWPLJKW PDNHPHFKDQJHP\PLQG´EXWWKDWZRXOG
be simply discontinuing the intention.44 To deal with this problem, Ferrero refers to the deep 
structure of our intentions. This includes all the conditions that qualify the content of the 
intention whether generic or specific, express or implied.45 It might not be immediately clear 
to an agent that a condition exists, but it may still play a role in her psychic economy and 
emerge when required even if dormant in the recesses of his mind. Identifying the conditions 
is a work in progress.46 It is true that Ferrero introduces questions of feasibility and 
advisability as generic placeholders for specific conditions that although not immediately 
operative could pop up, but these are not changes in mind for Ferrero, they are rational 
pressures integral to the intention.47 A conditional intention is not suspended. It exists now 
and the agent is to prepare himself now for doing A when and if the time comes.48 To claim 
                                                 
40
 Ferrero, supra note 23 at 700 
41
 Ibid 726-31 
42
 Ibid 726 
43
 Cartwright, supra note 12 at 239-'RQDOG'DYLGVRQµ,QWHQGLQJ¶LQ'RQDOG'DYLGVRQHG
Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 83 ay 94 
44
 Cartwright, supra note 12 at 242 
45
 Ferrero, supra n 23 at 702  
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an intention to go to Bruges unless I change my mind produces no rational pressure to 
prepare to go. What is the point in buying a Eurostar ticket if I might change my mind?  
 
(ii) Background and foreground conditions 
 
Klass argues that a background condition is one where the party accepts its satisfaction or 
non-satisfaction as a given, whereas he does not do the same for foreground conditions, 
which the agent recognises are open questions.49 Once a qualification is taken as a given, it is 
not erased from the content of the intention. The intention does not become unconditional. 
Rather the condition is pushed into the cognitive background, and the agent need no longer 
entertain it in his practical reasoning.50 However, if the intention were to become purely 
XQFRQGLWLRQDORQWKHDJHQW¶VFRPLQJWREHOLHYHWKHFRQGLWLRQVDWLVILHGKHLVFRPPLWWHGWR
acting even if he later discovers he was mistaken.51 That is unlikely. It is important that the 
conditions remain. If we are talking about a future intention the agent will need to keep them 
under review in order to decide whether revisions to his plans are required.52 The deep 
structure of the intention does not change. However, what does change is its epistemic 
version, which reflects the changing beliefs and acceptances of the agent concerning the 
conditions. Let assume I think I owe John $10. I know I will see him on Monday, so I form 
the intention to pay him on Monday. It is now a background condition of my intention that I 
owe the money. However, if I discover on Sunday that in fact I do not owe the money, I will 
reconsider the decision to pay the following day, something I would not do if the intention 
became purely unconditional.  
 
Before moving on, we also need to recognise that the distinction between belief and 
acceptance is important ± and one way in which it is so we see when examining collective 
intention in 2(B)(i). It is possible for us to accept things, for the purposes of our practical 
reasoning, that we do not necessarily believe 100%.53 For the purposes of buying a house I 
accept it will not burn down tomorrow (although if pressed I would concede that an arsonist 
might pass by), but for the purposes of getting insurance I do not simply accept that it will not 
burn down. My acceptance that it might burn down is precisely why I buy insurance.   
 
(C) Mistakes and Conditional Intentions  
 
After all of this preparatory work, we are now in a position to ask how it impacts on the way 
in which we analyse mistaken payment claims. The view taken here that the unfulfilled 
                                                 
49
 Klass, supra note 2 at 109-10 
50
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51
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53
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condition means that the law would disrespect us as autonomous agents if it did not permit 
UHFRYHU\LVRQHDOUHDG\H[WDQWLQWKHOLWHUDWXUH:KDWZHVHH%UDWPDQ¶VLGHDVDGGLQJWRWKLV
picture is to elucidate what type of condition we are talking about, how that condition affects 
the practical reasoning of the mistaken payor, and how the various norms interact with each 
other to produce the result that relief is warranted. %UDWPDQ¶VYLHZelucidates, in ways other 
DFWLRQWKHRULVWV¶YLHZVGRQRW, the structure of the claim we need to explain. We often divide 
mistake into mistake of fact and of law and this division is maintained here.  
 
(i) Mistakes of fact  
 
If it is a background condition of my intention to pay John $10 that I owe the money, I cannot 
deliberate on what I might do if I were free of this obligation. 2IFRXUVH,PLJKWWKLQN³,W¶V
such a shame I have to pay John $,FRXOGJRWRWKHFLQHPDLI,GLGQRW´<HWZKDW,cannot 
do ± consistently with maintaining the intention to pay John - is spend the $10 bill. I have to 
un-make the intention first; I must change my mind.54  
 
The justification of a mistake claim is sometimes put in terms of my intention being 
vitiated, and we have referred to this before and put the word in inverted commas.55 We can 
now see that there is nothing in fact wrong with my intention. The inverted commas were 
appropriate. I do indeed actually intend to make the payment; it is the motivation that is the 
issue. As Webb argues, the justification for relief is that the intention (with which) simply 
does not cover the case that actually arises.56 This matters because if the law does not permit 
recovery of the money I paid to John on the basis I owed him $10 when in fact I did not, it 
disrespects me as a self-legislating autonomous agent. Autonomy refers to my capacity to act 
in accordance with, what Nair refers to as, my own ³rationally determined norms.´ 57 As Nair 
puts it, a mistake as to the relevant facts may cause (indeed rationally compel) a person to act 
in a way that violates his own norms.58 Following the intention leads me to paying money I 
do not owe, an action inconsistent with the higher order policy only to pay what I owe and no 
more, a policy which has agential authority for me. In the same way, we can analyse the facts 
of Barclays Bank v Simms59 as follows. Barclays paid out on a cheque. They had not 
appreciated that the cheque had been stopped. Had it not been stopped, the cheque would 
have created an obligation on the bank to pay. It was therefore a background condition of the 
                                                 
54
 Assuming that I do not discover that in fact I do not owe the money after all, as posited in 
the previous section  
55
 Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006) at 137 
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 &KDUOLH:HEEµ,QWHQWLRQ0LVWDNHDQG5HVXOWLQJ7UXVWV¶LQ&KDUOHV0LWFKHOOHG
Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 315 at 323-24 
57
 Nair, supra note 5 at 389 
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 Ibid at 389  
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 [1980] QB 680 
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EDQN¶VSD\PHQWWKDWWKH\KDGDQREOLJDWLRQWRSD\7KHUHZDVQRREOLJDWLRQWRSD\EXWWKH
EDQN¶Vµintention ³ZLWKZKLFK´¶only covered the case where the cheque was payable.60 Had 
the bank realised this, its intention to pay ± had it been maintained - would have been means-
end incoherent, because of intention-belief inconsistency.  
 
%UDWPDQ¶VYLHZtherefore elucidates the structure of the claim further and is consistent 
with this justification offered, but we may still think it insufficient as an explanation. The 
puzzle is this: does Nair really explain why a defendant who has done nothing at all should be 
liable? In other words even if the agent has not acted autonomously why should the recipient 
care? Even if we could not think of an answer to this, Bratman would still though enable us to 
better understand the structure of the psychic states leading to a mistaken payment and we 
would still have made some progress. To answer the puzzle fully would require another paper 
but some comment is in order. The normal answer is that the defendant is no worse off and 
since no harm is done to him he cannot really have any objection,61 but this may simply beg 
the question of which baseline we use to decide that the defendant has not been harmed and 
why such a baseline is appropriate. Certainly there is an almost universal intuitive sense that 
the payment must be returned, but the admitted difficulty remains in articulating a 
justification for that intuition. It may be entirely pragmatic. Once we have decided that 
VRPHWKLQJLQWKHSD\RU¶VLQWHQWLRQLVDZU\WKLVLVVLPSO\WKHHDVLHVWZD\WRVRUWLWRXWDQG
any harm to the recipient is worth the cost. But again many will find this unsatisfactory.  
 
(ii) Mistakes of law  
 
Nair criticises my definition of mistakes of law, which characterises them as mistakes as to 
the interpretation of the authorities. I know (sometimes at least) what the relevant cases and 
statutes are, but I misinterpret them to require something they, properly understood, do not.62 
Nair says that that makes a mistake of law ZKDWVKHWHUPV³a normative mistake´. She argues 
on such a view when I pay under a mistake of law, I am mistaken as to the norms I should 
apply. If the court requires the recipient to repay it substitutes its own norms for my norms. It 
thereby violates my autonomous right to decide what those norms should be.63 She uses the 
example of a person who believes anyone who asks for money should be given it. If a court 
reversed a payment on the ground the norm was wrong, it would violate his right to choose 
on what basis to give out money, and Nair seems right that no recovery should be allowed.  
 
We saw earlier, however, that there is a hierarchy of norms. This is part of our account of 
agential authority, and Nair does not deal adequately, or indeed at all, with the hierarchy of 
norms in her account of mistaken payments. %UDWPDQ¶VYLHZVKHOSXVLQWHJUDWHWKDWKLHUDUFK\
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into our account of the claim and therefore better understand what it means in this context to 
talk about acting in accordance with our own rationally determined norms. To recap, I have 
higher order policies which have agential authority for me; these tell me which of my desires 
or motivations are appropriate reasons for action in my practical deliberations. There may 
well be several layers of such norms, of differing levels of detail and specificity. One of my 
higher order norms is that I will act in accordance with the law. That higher order norm then 
leads to two lower norms. The first is that I pay my creditors what I owe them and no more, 
which on interpreting the law I decide is $1000; I believe the contract to be valid when it is 
void. There are three norms in play therefore. There is the normative proposition of law 
(which is incorrect) that I owe $1000. There is the policy to pay what I owe and no more and 
the still higher order policy to obedience to the law. My reasoning process here is different 
from the case that Nair introduces. In the charitable giving scenario there is no disconnect 
between my higher order desires and my immediate intention. I have a higher order policy of 
generosity, which tells me that when John asks for $1000, that is a justifying reason for 
forming an intention to pay. Here by contrast there is such a disconnect. My intention to pay 
is, as Nair correctly says, based on a normative mistake, but if I pay I am not acting in 
accordance with the higher order policy in favour of paying what I owe (and no more) that 
treats my misinterpretation as a justifying reason for forming an intention to pay and acting 
on it. In this case, but not in a charity case, my payment puts me in violation of a higher order 
policy with agential authority, and does so in the same way as a factual error.  
 
1DLU¶VH[DPSOHLVRQHRID normative moral error ± the court would consider it a moral 
error to be so generous.64 It is possible to conceive of moral mistakes if there is an objective 
measure of moral obligation. Dworkin argues there is.65 He must do so; there is an element to 
his theory of law which examines the moral justification of the law. Nonetheless we are 
intuitively less happy with relief for moral mistakes DQGWKHUHIRUHZLWK1DLU¶VH[ample above. 
This may indicate no more than that one of our higher order policies is that we act in 
accordance with externally generated legal norms, but not internally generated moral norms, 
and this may derive from the presence of a legitimate law-determining authority,66 but no 
such equivalent for morals, which is what for Dworkin delineates legal from other political 
rights.67 The importance of this is that it allows the court to substitute its norms for mine, 
because one of my higher order policies, ones which have agential authority for me, is that I 
will submit to the views of such a legitimate legal norm-determining and adjudicative 
authority.  
                                                 
64
 Virgo, supra note 55 at 150-51, discussing Larner v LCC [1949] 2 KB 683 
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Press, 2011) at ch 2  
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(2) Failure of Basis 
 
A lot happened in the first part of this article. However, the critical point is that a condition ± 
such as that I owe the money ± accepted as true and therefore operating as a background 
condition turned out not to have been true7KHSD\RU¶VLQWHQWLRQUXQVRXWDQGKHGRHVQRWDFW
in accordance with his higher order policies. What if the background condition relates to the 
future? This matters, not least because many conditions in failure of consideration claims are 
conditions as to future counter-performance by the other party. A simple case to start with is 
that of uncommunicated mispredictions, because they do not involve collective intention. The 
first subsection therefore examines that phenomenon. The second moves on to examine how 
collective intention operates and the impact of background conditionality on collective 
intention. 
 
(A) Temporally Extended Agency and Mispredictions 
 
We cannot understand how a condition as to the future ± a background misprediction ± 
affects our intention without examining how intention functions as a planning tool and how it 
is therefore future oriented. The complex web of partially formed plans, sub-plans and larger 
plans referred to in an earlier section renders this unavoidable. The first subsection aims to 
explain just how our agency, the operation of which helped to justify relief for mistake, looks 
into the future. The second explores the implications of this for the law on mispredictions. 
Which conditions, which we necessarily accept as inevitably going to be satisfied, can or 
should give rise to relief and which not, and why?  
 
(i) The Nature of temporally extended agency 
 
We have already seen that Bratman argues that the importance of the notion of intention lies 
in part at least in our ability to make plans which allow for cross-temporal co-ordination with 
our future selves. This ability is predicated on general self-governing policies which have 
agential authority for us and these policies constitute us as thinking beings over time. This 
Lockean view of personal identity seems, as we said earlier, very plausible, and we try to 
expand on the idea in this section to understand the effect of different kinds of condition on 
our future-oriented intention.  
 
There are typically said to be two aspects of the will ± the reflective and diachronic. 
Velleman raises the former and argues that by making up our minds before we act we ensure 
that our performance is neither automatic nor unreflective.68 In order to make up our mind we 
reflect on the reasons to act in a particular way as to any other way. Having predicted that we 
will act in a particular way, our desire for self-knowledge takes over and we intend to act in 
that way and that intention is a reason to act because otherwise we do not increase our self-
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 J David Velleman, Self to Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 214 
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knowledge.69 This is reflective and it also reveals a cognitivist view of intention.70 The 
diachronic dimension relates to future-directed intentions, and is critical for the argument 
made in this paper.  
 
Ferrero addresses the issue.71 For Ferrero, Velleman ignores the diachronic (future-
oriented) dimension in that he does not appreciate that there are aspects to the will that cannot 
be explained through his reflective model. In short if I decide to go to buy mince pies, then at 
each moment I might be said to be reflectively acting to gain self-knowledge, by putting my 
coat on, getting in the car, checking I have my wallet etc. But this type of moment to moment 
agential governance is simply inadequate for Ferrero72 ± and rightly so. We are not, as we 
have seen before, that type of time-slice agent. Ferrero DUJXHV³DWHDFKPRPHQWRIWKH
DFWLYLW\¶VXQIROGLQJRQHVHHVRQeself as autonomously and continuously engaged in the 
DFWLYLW\DVDWHPSRUDOO\LQWHJUDWHGZKROH´73 Indeed he claims that without the diachronic will 
we could not even conceive of the goal of getting the mince pies in the future.74 Ferrero goes 
on to discuss what he calls the internal unity of the agent. He suggests that the diachronic will 
is necessary not merely to engage in temporally unified activities, but a temporally unified 
H[LVWHQFH7REHDWHPSRUDOO\LQWHJUDWHGDJHQWRQH¶s existence over time must be more than 
an uninterrupted line of physical connections. There must be an overall arrangement of some 
sort in which the agent at all times accepts the global constraints on their action in terms of 
their activities and the coherence of their intentions with each other over time.75 If we accept 
constraints over time on our actions it would be unreal to suppose that we never act on the 
assumption of something to occur in the future. It is unreal to think therefore that when I start 
reading articles by Bratman, knowing that one of the constraints on my finishing this essay 
will be that the teaching allocation respects the 40% of time for research rule, I do not assume 
that the Head of School will work on that basis, even though I realise he has not yet begun the 
teaching allocation.  
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)HUUHUR¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHGLDFKURQLFZLOOLVUHIOHFWHGLQ%UDWPDQ¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQ
intention as critical to our existence as planning agents. If intention has as its aim to make its 
content true, we can see this in two ways. Either we can see intentions atomistically. That is 
we can see intention in such a way that each intention aims to make its aim true. Or, as 
Bratman does,76 we could see matters more holistically. Each intention would aim to make its 
FRQWHQWWUXHDVDSDUWRIDFRRUGLQDWHGUHDOL]DWLRQRIRQH¶VSODQQLQJV\VWHPLQWKHZRUOGDV
one believes it to be. Bratman explains this in terms of a projected unity of agency, which 
provides a rational force towards the agglomerativity of intentions. As well as valuing 
research, I value teaching, and so planning my future work involves dividing time between 
this paper and my teaching preparation, so that both get done and done properly.  
 
We see our entire project of activities as a whole not just as time-sliced bits and 
pieces. The importance of the diachronic will can be established by demonstrating that there 
are activities that can only be pursued in this mode.77 Rational discourse is one of )HUUHUR¶V
examples. Where an agent makes a claim, lays out an objection or an argument, or offers 
further explanation, she is not merely engaged in saying things, which just happen to come 
out of her mouth one after the other in no particular order. She must make sure they are 
consistent and coherent with things said in the past and also prepare rebuttals if her 
interlocutor puts a counter-objection to her.78  
 
For Fererro agents like us can only achieve the aim by engaging in internally unified 
activities. The diachronic will is indispensable to overcome the difficulties of our being 
temporal beings with limited resources and rationality. There are differences with Bratman 
then but they are not huge. Ferrero argues, however, the norm of agglomerativity might be 
stricter once we take temporal unity into account. This is because the diachronic agent sees 
both the activity and his agency as extending over time into the future; there is pressure for 
greater stability of intentions over time, and therefore also of self-governing policies.79 
Ferrero argues that a structure such DV%UDWPDQ¶V requires only very short time spans for the 
cross-temporal ties between parts of specific plans. He believes that the stability of the higher 
RUGHUSROLFLHVLVDWEHVWIUDJLOHRQ%UDWPDQ¶VYLHZEXWif we are temporally integrated the 
stability of the policies is greater.80 :KHWKHU)HUUHUR¶VFULWLFLVPRI%UDWPDQLVMXVWLILHGRUQRW
we can conclude that the broadly Lockean view of identity accepted here requires that the 
agent maintain stable policies and certainly if the agent is continually looking into the future 
the plans he makes will be reconsidered frequently if those policies are insufficiently stable, 
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and will be reconsidered frequently if the agent does not assume or accept certain conditions 
as to the future will be satisfied.  
 
If this is true, we can say that in acting to buy building supplies now as part of a plan 
to build an extension to my house, for example, which can only be successful if a builder can 
be found, in buying the bricks I must act background conditionally on being able to find a 
builder. This is all part of our ability to co-ordinate with ourselves over time. If we were 
unable to accept things as to the future, we could not do many of the things we do. Planning 
agency is always future-oriented. On this basis it is not easy to see why accepting a future 
condition as satisfied for the purpose of putting our plans into action should not be treated the 
same as accepting a present condition as satisfied.  
 
(ii) Unilateral mispredictions 
 
How should we treat mispredictions, relating to a possible future event as opposed to a 
present or past matter of fact or law?81 If from a philosophical standpoint it seems to make 
little difference because our intentions as part of wider plans always have an element of 
futurity to them it is unclear why there should be no relief. After all if the bank is able to 
recover in Barclays Bank v Simms because the background condition that the money was 
owed was in fact unsatisfied because the cheque had been stopped before the payment was 
made, and theUHIRUHWKHEDQN¶VLQWHQWLRQGLG not cover the case as it turns out to be, the same 
could be said, for example, about an assumption that liability will accrue in the future.  
 
The case law muddies the waters somewhat. In Re Griffiths82 for example Griffiths 
made a disposition of property and died the next year. Lewison J held that the gift could be 
revoked on the ground of GriffiWKV¶PLVWDNHWKDWKHZDVQRWVXIIHULQJIURPFDQFHU83 This 
characterisation can be criticised ± Lloyd LJ in the English Court of Appeal in Pitt v Holt 
thought it was a misprediction as to how long he would live for.84 The orthodoxy suggests 
that if characterised as misprediction, no relief is possible. Yet given that mispredictions are 
based on beliefs about the present ± here a mistake as to whether Griffiths was ill led to a 
misprediction as to his life expectancy - it is easy to re-characterise mispredictions in this 
way. That said assumed future obligations are, or seem to be, treated differently. In Kerrison 
v Glynn Mills Currie and Co85 the claimant was accustomed to putting the Kessler & Co in 
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funds to honour bills of exchange drawn by a Mexican mine (Bote Mining Company). The 
New York bank went insolvent and the claimant had already deposited a sum of money to 
their credit with the defendant bank on the assumption that liability would arise. The money 
was recoverable. 
 
Seah argues that relief for mispredictions is barred for two reasons. First, the decision 
making of the claimant is not impaired and secondly he is a risk taker. As for the first, we 
have already seen that the planning function of intention and the way our agency spans past 
present and future entails that we must, in order to plan properly, accept (in context) certain 
conditions as ERXQGWREHIXOILOOHG,WLVQRWREYLRXVWKHUHIRUHWKDWLQFRQWH[WWKHFODLPDQW¶V
decision-making was unimpaired, although we will make a further point on this later. As for 
the second, Seah says the future is always uncertain and therefore the claimant must realise it 
might not turn out as he predicts.86 I will be subjectively taking a risk that the event or 
condition will not take place. But I need not do so subjectively for the rule to kick in. Maybe 
the claimant is an objective risk-taker. There is a risk of things not turning out that way and 
adverted to or not that bars relief. The law has been unwilling to accept objective risk-taking 
in mistake cases.87 Nonetheless Davies argues an objective approach is intuitively more 
appropriate.88 He uses the example of a busker. The busker wants to be paid but takes the risk 
of getting nothing. Yes, but a misprediction as to the behaviour of others gives no relief 
because they have no opportunity to refuse the busking. The example is flawed, but in any 
case talk of risk is conclusory; the busker (or mispredictor more generally) only takes the risk 
because we have already decided there is no right to be (re-) paid.  
 
The type of risk-taking about future events I have described here (if it is risk taking) 
is, however, simply endemic; planning would be impossible without it. It may be precisely 
the endemic nature of this type of risk-taking that justifies non-relief. Further what keeps us 
to our plans is anticipated future regret; that is we know that if we do not act now we will 
regret it later. I might know that if I have a second glass of wine and am unable to work 
afterwards that I will regret not finishing this paper. Despite my really wanting more wine, 
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that future regret stops me.89 Anticipated future regret seems more easily discountable 
because there is always the possibility, given that our intentions and higher order self-
governing policies are not immutable, that those policies will change and we withdraw from 
the plan. Secondly, this tends to explain why a misprediction as to future legal liability might 
more easily justify relief; the court simply takes it as read that our policy in favour of paying 
what we are obliged by law to pay will not change, yet it does not take it as read that when I 
pay on the basis of some other misprediction that I would not have withdrawn from the plan 
before the predicted event happens (or does not). This argument may, however, be somewhat 
tenuous as I complain only after the predicted event fails to happen so we might say that in 
point of fact I did not withdraw from the plan; at the point at which I acted that could not, 
however, have been said for certain and that may be of some importance.  
 
(B) Joint Agency and Collective Intention  
 
This section aims to explore what it means to act collectively and therefore what the failure to 
act collectively might imply. There are simple cases we might discuss. We might paint the 
house together or go for a walk together or carry a piano upstairs together. These are all cases 
of joint activity in a way that everyone racing to the shelter when it rains in the park is not.90 
This subsection picks up on the argument from the last section, because if we paint the house 
together, it seems sensible to think that our intention to paint the house depends in part on my 
accepting that you will not just down paint brushes and go the nearest bar and vice versa.  
 
(i) What is collective intention?  
 
This is rather difficult. There are different views on this. In particular we can contrast the 
work of Michael Bratman with that of Margaret Gilbert and others. Gilbert rests her idea of 
FROOHFWLYHLQWHQWLRQRQDSOXUDOVXEMHFWDQGWKHJURXS¶VHPXODWLQJWKHDFWLRQRIDVLQJOH
subject.91 )RU%UDWPDQFROOHFWLYHLQWHQWLRQDULVHVLQWKRVHVFHQDULRVZKHUHZHFDQVD\³:H
LQWHQGWR-´92 That ± for our purposes - involves two interlocking individual intentions, such 
that I intend that we J, and you intend that we J and we each intend to do our part in J-ing 
knowing, or at least reliably predicting the other also intends that we J and will intend to do 
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and actually do their part in the plan. In most cases of restitution for failure of basis we will 
be concerned with some form of shared goal: an interest rate swaps agreement, building a 
house, arranging the purchase of a company.  
 
At no point in his account of, what he describes as, modest sociality does Bratman resort 
to what Margaret Gilbert has called a plural subject. Gilbert rests her idea of collective 
LQWHQWLRQRQDSOXUDOVXEMHFWDQGWKHJURXS¶VHPXODWLQJWKHDFWLRQRIDVLQJOHVXEMHFW93 For 
%UDWPDQWKLVYLRODWHVZKDWKHFDOOVWKH³RZQ-DFWLRQFRQGLWLRQ´94 which is that the subject of 
the intending should be the agent of the intended activity. The idea behind the own-action 
FRQGLWLRQLVVLPSOH,FDQQRWLQWHQG\RXUDFWLRQ7KHUHLVQRPHWDSK\VLFDO³ZH´VHSDUDWHIURP
WKHWZRGLVWLQFW³,¶V´7KLVVHHPVLQWXLWLYHO\SODXVLEOHKRZHYHU%UDWPDQ¶VRZQYLHZDOVR
violates that condition but does so in an acceptable way. It does so via a mechanism that 
%UDWPDQFDOOV³RWKHUDJHQWFRQGLWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQ´7KDWGHVFULEHVWKHPHFKDQLVPE\ZKLFK,
intend that we do something. In intending that we J, I believe that my intention will lead to 
our J-ing, and that we would not J if I did not so intend. And, normally, in intending that we J 
you believe likewise. We can mesh these by saying that I believe that my intending that we J 
is a cause or reason of your intending that we J and therefore of your doing your part in J-ing. 
Consequently Bratman is able to draw on what we know of ordinary intentions in order to 
understood apparently shared intentions. His view then is that  
a. We each intend that we J.  
b. For each of us the persistence of the intention that we J depends on continued 
knowledge (or acceptance) that the other also intends that we J, thus leading to its 
being common knowledge that we each intend that we J  
c. if and only if we both so intend, then will we intend to J and so in fact J95  
 
A bilateral transaction, this paper suggests, is one where this holds good; failure of 
consideration can then operate whenever there is such a putative collective intention and only 
in sucKFDVHVEHFDXVHRQO\LQWKRVHFDVHVLVWKHRWKHUSDUW\¶VDXWRQRP\HQJDJHG,PSRUWDQWO\
for Bratman any constraints in terms of my being forced to mesh sub-plans with yours or find 
ways to do my part of J are purely rational norms, but your intentions and plans pertaining to 
our J-ing have agential authority for me because of what Roth describes as my bridge 
intention to mesh my J-related plans and intentions with yours.96 As far as possible, Bratman 
argues that collective intention is subject to the same rational constraints as personal. For 
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there to be a shared intention Bratman suggests we have the normal rational pressure in 
favour of means-end coherence, consistency and agglomerativity mentioned earlier.97  
 
Your intention that we J has some agential authority for me in that it helps settle what I 
am to do; in its absence I become free to decide what to do. What I am to do is no longer 
settled. Consequently there must be a connection such that each of us is responsive to the 
other in ways that track the fulfilment of the end goal.98 Roth disputes this; he argues that all I 
need to do is to stop intending. Because your commitment to our J-ing is partly dependent on 
PH\RXPXVWVWRSLQWHQGLQJWKDWZH-,I\RX¶UHnot committed, neither am I.99 Further Roth 
argues that I never was committed. He argues this by referring to a peculiar type of self-
referential intention - ³,LQWHQGWR$RQFRQGLWLRQWKDW,LQWHQGWR$´+HVXJJHVWVTXLWH
correctly that this does not settle the question of whether I am to A. Effectively this 
explanation of collective intention falls into the same trap. My intention is referential on your 
intention which is referential on mine (and I know this); consequently I intend to A if (on 
condition that) you intend to A if (on condition that) I intend to A. Everything is circular and 
there was no collective intention in the first place.  
 
Bratman would reject this and it tells us something interesting about how he would view a 
failure of basis claim. For Bratman in order for me to intend the joint activity I must believe, 
or be able to reliably predict that the other participants intend it or will do so in due course.100 
I may therefore intend that we J even if you do not; my intention that we J is not the same as 
our intending to J, although it is a component. I can, he suggests, settle for myself whether we 
J by making an appropriate prediction, one of which might be that my intention that we J will 
lead you to intend the same. This is an aspect of the idea of ³RWher-agent conditional 
mediation´, which we have encountered already. I intend that we J, because I believe or 
accept that my intending that we J is a cause or reason of your intending that we J and 
therefore of your doing your part in J-ing. /HW¶VVD\ I want to dance the tango at a party with 
Maria.101 Maria is absurdly indecisive and will not say that she will dance with me when I ask 
before the party. I rely on her intending or coming to intend to dance with me. I also need to 
use my reliance as an element in my practical reasoning in deciding for example whether to 
wear my dancing shoes to the party.  
 
7KLVPLJKWPDNHLWDSSHDUDVLI%UDWPDQ¶VFROOHFWLYHLQWHQWLRQVDUHH[WUHPHO\IUDJLOH<HW
they may not be as fragile as first appears. First, although Bratman does not require that there 
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be moral norms between the parties for there to be a shared or collective intention, he accepts 
that such assurance-based moral obligations are useful in order to increase the stability of the 
shared intention over time. This gives rise to what Bratman calls obligation-based 
interdependence.102 In most cases with which unjust enrichment deals we have an agreed 
VKDUHGSODQSHUVRQDOLQWHQWLRQVWRSHUIRUPRQH¶VRZQSDUWLQWKDWSODQZKLFKDUHGHULYHG
from the joint intention, and strong intersubjective obligations which are capable of surviving 
a change of mind.103 Those obligations may be purely moral, but they may also be contractual 
and legally binding. In either case, Tuomela argues that acceptances of the joint plan must be 
communicated so that everyone knows that the others accept the plan.104 That mutual 
NQRZOHGJHPXVWEHRXWLQWKHRSHQZHKDYHVHHQDERYHWKDW%UDWPDQ¶VDQDO\VLVRIMRLQW
intention involves common knowledge or acceptance that the other party intends that we J, 
and the other party knows I believe this. Communication is one ± the only according to 
Tuomela ± way in which such knowledge can arise.105 
 
To explain where such moral obligations come from, Bratman DSSHDOVWR6FDQORQ¶VPRUDO
principle of fidelity, which was developed in the context of explaining why promises are not 
exclusive in generating such moral obligations.106 These moral obligations to keep to the plan 
DUHJHQHUDWHGYLDWKHRWKHUSDUW\¶VLQWHQWLRQDOO\LQGXFHGUHOLDQFH,107 and this is consistent with 
at least some views of the basis for contract. Kimel suggests that contract and promises fulfil 
the same instrumental function of facilitating a form of reliance.108 Barnett posits that the 
obligations of contract are generated thURXJKWKHSDUW\¶VFRQVHQW109 but the objectively 
apparent consent is what is important precisely because it gives the other party a reliable 
meaning of the statements to base their own conduct on. Secondly, Bratman posits a type of 
constructivism,110 whereby individual participants might be driven by norms of individual 
planning agency, but content of the intentions and their inter-relationship bring with it certain 
social norms which the parties internalise and use in their practical reasoning. In other words 
each of us use the fact we accept the other intends that we J as a factor in our own future 
planning as to how we J and what we do after J.  
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(ii) Failure of Bratmanian basis 
 
At last therefore we get to the point where we can ask what impact the non-satisfaction of 
different background conditions has on a collective intention and how that can ± if at all ± be 
seen as a legally effective failure of consideration. It is worth stressing again that we do not 
QHHGWRVXEVFULEHWRDQ\SDUWLFXODUMXVWLILFDWRU\WKHRU\WRDFFHSW%UDWPDQ¶VFRQWULEXtion to 
RXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHFODLP¶V structure, although an explanation based on respect for our 
autonomy in the sense outlined above is a plausible one, which we accept. The failure of 
basis might be the failure of a contingent agreed (non-promissory) future condition, as in 
Chillingworth v Esche.111 ,WLVDOZD\VSRVVLEOHLQ%UDWPDQ¶VWHUPVWRVHH-(the thing 
intended) as that the defendant be enriched. We may cavil that this is unlikely, but in 
Chillingworth itself the claimant agreed to purchase land subject to contract and paid a 
deposit. A contract was drawn up but the claimant did not sign and claimed the deposit back 
± the intention that the defendant retain (be enriched by) the deposit was explicitly lacking. 
The claim succeeded as the contingent FRQGLWLRQRIDFRQWUDFW¶VEHLQJVLJQHGKDGIDLOHGIf so, 
we can say that  
a. They each intended that the deposit be paid and the defendant thereby be enriched if 
X - a signed contract results 
b. For each party the persistence of the intention that the defendant be enriched 
depended on continued acceptance that the other also intends the deposit be received 
(and the defendant thereby enriched) as part of the plan 
c. If and only if they both intended that there be a contract, payment of a deposit and the 
defendant be enriched would they intend as much 
d. But the purchaser knew that not-X ± there is (and will be) no signed contract - so his 
intention that the defendant be enriched by the payment of the deposit no longer held. 
7KHYHQGRU¶V intention could VWLOOKROGRQ%UDWPDQ¶VYLHZEXWRQO\VRORQJDs he 
continues to believe or accept that the other party still intends the contract and so the 
enrichment. Since in Chillingworth both parties were aware RQWKHYHQGRU¶VWHQGHULQJ
of the contract that not-X the collective intention that the defendant be enriched 
collapsed.  
  
It might be the failure of a promissory condition as to the future. In Benedetti v Sawiris112 
Benedetti had made an agreement (the Acquisition Agreement) with Sawiris (and his 
associated companies) whereby they would jointly acquire Wind, a telecommunications 
company, from the Italian energy firm, Enel, with the aid of outside investors. The method by 
which the acquisition was to take place changed considerably. The services that Benedetti 
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actually provided were not those contracted for. As Arden LJ put it in the Court of Appeal, 
the agreement simply ran out.113 If so we can say (simplifying somewhat) that  
a. They each intended that Sawiris be enriched by the services (as part of a wider plan) 
b. For each of them the persistence of the intention that Sawiris be enriched depended on 
continued belief or acceptance that the other intended that he be enriched (as part of 
the plan) 
c. Benedetti intended to perform the services as his part of the plan (part of which was 
he would be paid) and believed or acceptHGWKDWWKDWZRXOGEHDFDXVHRI6DZLULV¶
paying 
d. Sawiris did not pay  
e. %HQHGHWWL¶VDFFHStance that Sawiris intended to receive the services as part of the 
wider plan failed, and therefore his intention that Sawiris be enriched failed. Sawiris 
could hardly complain about this because his failure was the problem. Parenthetically 
we might note the flipside of this, which is that if you do intend that we J and intend 
to Y as part of our J-LQJ\RXFDQVD\³,DPUHDG\DQGZLOOLQJWRSHUIRUP´114 which 
negates the cause of action, because it negates the failure of the promissory condition.  
 
It is rare, if not unheard of, for an intention to be wholly unconditional.115 For Bratman 
there is rational normative pressure to make our sub-plans mesh. This entails ideally that we 
collectively plan for the success of the activity, and that we plan for the different 
contingencies. Klass contends that a foreground necessary condition ± that is a condition non-
fulfilment of which will make the intention impossible to go through with, but which might 
yet still not be fulfilled) reduces the rational pressure to intend means to the end116 and it 
reduces the chances of performance and agreeing ways to fill in the gaps.117 Basically it may 
still turn out to be a waste of my time to prepare to do something when it is not yet clear that I 
will be able or allowed to do it. However, given the rational pressure to mesh sub-plans we 
should try to agree on contingencies. The difficulty comes with background conditions. These 
can (but need not) be agreed ± in which case it is a collective background condition and 
Chillingworth v Esche is at least arguably an example of this. If the background condition is 
mine alone the question of the effect of a unilateral mistake emerges.  
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Let us take the swaps cases as an example ± although in many cases there would in fact 
have been a mistake on both sides. The interest rate swaps agreements made by a large 
number of local authorities in England in the 1980s were deemed void and ultra vires, and 
Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council118 is authority for the proposition that the losing 
party may sue in mistake. In an open swap, where payments remained to be made when the 
swap was ended, failure of consideration was also (uncontroversially) a valid cause of action. 
We concentrate on the effect of the mistake here 
a. I intend that we engage in the swap and that you be enriched by my payments if the 
swaps agreement is valid at law; you intend that we engage in the swap and that you 
thereby be enriched simpliciter. We each therefore intend that there be performance of 
the swap.  
b. The persistence of your intention that you yourself be enriched by my payments in 
pursuance of the agreement depends on your acceptance that I intend that you be 
enriched via the swap and vice versa. It is therefore a condition of your intention that 
we engage in the swap and that you be enriched thereby that I intend it also.  
c. If and only if we both intend to engage in the swap, will we carry the swap through.  
d. Given that my background condition of the validity of the agreement is not met, I do 
not intend that you be enriched because my payments were on the basis of an 
intention conditional on facts other than those that turned out to be the case. You can 
continue to intend that the swap go ahead (ie you can continue to intend that we J) 
until you are aware of my lack of intention, but we no longer intend to engage in the 
swap and we no longer intend that you be enriched.  
 
I should therefore recover in mistake as there is a background condition (the validity of 
the obligation) to my payment that was in fact unfulfilled, even though I believed or accepted 
it was fulfilled. The fact that my interlocking personal intention falls away means that the 
collective intention falls away too because ultimately your intention that we J is mediated via 
mine and therefore also fails. When you know that I will not be paying, your expectation of 
counter-performance fails. There is a failure of consideration, and likewise for me when it 
becomes clear you will not be performing.  
 
(iii)  Implications for the common law 
 
TKHLPSRUWDQFHRI%UDWPDQ¶VYLHZlies in three insights. The first, as we have just seen, is 
that it allows us to see why the two causes of action ± mistake and failure of consideration - 
can be concurrent. Subject to any super-added obligations, which, if of legal effect, will need 
to be rescinded, mistake and failure of consideration should on this view be able to lie 
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concurrently.119 Edelman ± now Edelman J of the Supreme Court of Western Australia - 
argues that in bilateraOFDVHVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VDXWRQRP\LVDOVRHQJDJHGDQGWKHUHIRUH
communication between the parties is required for relief to be available,120 which entails that 
the causes of action cannot lie concurrently. This is the wrong way round. The real position is 
that it is only because of the communication that there is a collective intention and 
bilaterality$VZHKDYHVHHQPXWXDONQRZOHGJHRIHDFKRWKHU¶VEHOLHIVDQGLQWHQWLRQVLVYLWDO
for a shared collective intention and therefore a shared basis. Some of the cases which 
Edelman criticises are therefore not, in point of fact, bilateral transactions. He argues for 
example that Dextra Bank v Bank of Jamaica121 is a bilateral transaction. The belief that 
'H[WUDKDGPDGHDVWRWKH%R-¶VWDNLQJDORDQZDVcausative of the payment, but relief was 
barred because they had not communicated that belief there was a loan.122 Bant and 
Creighton argue that the decision would be defensible as barring a claim in failure of 
consideration, but relief in mistake should not be so restricted.123 The BoJ thought there was a 
currency purchase; Dextra thought it was a loan. It is reminiscent of the case of Raffles v 
Wichelhaus124 where there was no contract because the parties were, unbeknownst to each 
other, referring to entirely different ships with the same name. There was no contract or 
collective intention there, and likewise in Dextra, because they were talking at cross-
purposes. In such a case a mistake claim must still be possible.   
 
The second insight therefore that Bratman gives us is that understanding failure of 
consideration as a failure of collective intention allows us to distinguish between cases which 
are failure of consideration and cases where we should give relief, if at all, on a different 
basis. It gives us a means RIFRQWUROOLQJIDLOXUHRIEDVLV¶ ambit and preventing its uncontrolled 
imperial expansion. An example of this is 0DKHU¶VVXJJHVWLRQ125 that Woolwich Building 
Society v IRC,126 where the building society was granted repayment of money paid under 
regulations that turned out to be void, be seen in terms of failure of basis. It should not be. It 
does not matter whether the Inland Revenue Commissioners knew or agreed with the 
building society that they (the IRC) take any risk of payment not being due. It was not due 
and in the context of overpayments of tax, this is all we need.  
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Related to this is the third insight to which we have already alluded several times. 
Risk is irrelevant or at least superfluous ± despite its enduring popularity in the cases and 
literature. Risk is intuitive, which probably explains that popularity, but if I take the risk, all 
that means is that the collective intention has not failed. 
  
Let us make one final point about the ambit of the claim, related to our second insight, as 
a postscript. Robert Chambers has argued that automatic resulting trusts are based on failure 
of consideration.127 In Vandervell v IRC128 for instance Vandervell wanted to endow a chair 
at the Royal College of Surgeons. He arranged to transfer to them a number of shares, with an 
option for his trustee company to buy them back. The Inland Revenue claimed that he had not 
divested himself fully of the beneficial interest in the shares. The RCS had, as part of the 
agreement with Vandervell, granted an option to buy the shares back to the trustee. An option 
is itself a proprietary right in the thing subject to it. The trustee company retained a 
relationship with Vandervell in that he retained the right to decide on what trusts the shares 
would be held after the option was exercised. He failed to name the trust beneficiaries. There 
was therefore a resulting trust. The recipient of the money is enriched at the expense of the 
claimant and the condition for the transfer, a trust, failed. The important point is that the 
trustee was never intended to hold the asset outright.129  
 
The trust might fail for a number of reasons. It might fail because no beneficiary was 
named as in Vandervell. It might fail because the objects are uncertain ± P\³IDYRXULWH
XQGHUJUDGXDWH´VD\130 but in these cases it will not fail because a collective intention to 
create a trust fails. We can demonstrate this relatively easily. It is trite that a trust will not fail 
for want of a trustee;131 the court has a statutory power to appoint a trustee where it is 
expedient to do so.132 Consequently if the trust is valid and the trustee has no interest in 
acting he can be replaced. In initial failure cases a collective intention of the settlor and 
trustee that there be a trust is neither necessary nor sufficient. Alternatively where the trustee 
has agreed to act, but the basis ± the marriage of the beneficiaries ± fails to take place there 
has been a failure of a collective intention,133 but this is not a necessary condition. It seems 
                                                 
127
 5REHUW&KDPEHUVµ5HVXOWLQJ7UXVWV¶LQ$QGUHZ%XUURZVDQG$ODQ5RGJHUHGVMapping 
the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 246 
128
 [1967] 2 AC 291 (HL) 
129
 Duncan Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011) at 188-189 
130
 'XQFDQ6KHHKDQµ5HVXOWLQJ7UXVWVSine Causa and the Structure of Proprietary 
RHVWLWXWLRQ¶ OUCLJ 1 at 24 
131
 Graham Virgo, The Principles of Equity and Trusts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) at 394  
132
 In England under the Trustee Act 1925, s 41 
133
 Essery v Cowlard (1884) 26 Ch D 191; Sheehan, supra note 130 at 25 
28 
 
therefore that resulting trusts are not really based on a failure of collective basis but 
individual basis. This of course does not mean that we ought not to still see these as unjust 
enrichment cases. The Vandervell type case would after all be a condictio sine causa specialis 
in South African law,134 but the failure of a future condition - WKHSDUWLHV¶PDUULDJHin Essery 
v Coulard135 - a condictio causa data causa non secuta, indicating the different underlying 
rationales of the two cases. The fact that they are both labelled as automatic resulting trusts 
and the fact that this is now deeply entrenched in the common law does, however, suggest 
that we must accept failure of basis as having stretched (a little) too far and that it cannot be 
easily pulled back. Nonetheless, as I have argued before in this context it makes little 
practical difference, except as to limitation and private international law consequences.136  
 
(3) Conclusion  
 
This paper has attempted to show that failure of consideration and mistake claims both have 
the same structure where a condition accepted as true turns out untrue. To summarise, in a 
mistake case the claimant¶VLQWHQWLRQGRHVQRWFRYHUWKHIDFWVDVWKH\WXUQHGRXWWREHDQGVR 
he failed to act on an attitude with agential authority for him. The claimant did not act as a 
self-governing autonomous agent and if the law does not reverse the transaction it disrespects 
him as such. It is more complex in the failure of consideration context. That is typically based 
on a failure of a future condition, but is always based on the non-fulfilment of some condition 
ultimately relating to and affecting WKHSDUWLHV¶FROOHFWLYHLQWHQWLRQ. Once a joint plan is 
developed ± to purchase an Italian telecommunications company for example ± if there is a 
condition to the claimaQW¶VLQWHQWLRQVXFKWKDWKLVintention that we J is not operative in the 
circumstances, the collective intention fails. If that FRQGLWLRQLVWKHRWKHUSDUW\¶VSHUIRUPDQFH
the condition can be shown to be not yet unsatisfied by demonstrating that the defendant is 
ready and willing to perform. If it is a mistake, both actions can lie simultaneously.  
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